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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
li'RANCES O'HAIR,
Plaintiff-A ppeUant,
- vs. -

Case No.

JOHN S. KOUNALIS and
GEORGE KOUNALIS,
Defendants-Respondents.

11445

APP'ELLANT'S BRIEF.
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Plaintiff seeks to recover loans made by her to
defendants on oral agreements and not fully repaid.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Defendant's motion for summary judgment of dismissal of plaintiff's complaint was granted on the sole
ground that the statute of limitations had run.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the summary judgment
and trial on the merits.
1

STATEMENT OFF AGTS
Because this is an appeal from a summary judgment, the facts alleged by plaintiff in her pleadings and
deposition will be set forth, even though some of them
are denied by defendants.
Plaintiff was orphaned at age 14, and resided until
age 18 at her parents home in Salt Lake City, Utah,
with her older sister and a Mrs. Leone Small, who had
been hired as housekeeper for the girls by their guardian.
Mrs. Small was mother-in-law of defendant John Kounalis, hereafter referred to as "John." (Pltf. depos. p. 4,
L. 17 - p. 5, L. 23) vVhen plaintiff became 18, in 1962,
the home was sold and she received $11,000.00 as her
share of her mother's estate. (Pltf. depos. p. 8, L. 4 - 14)
Mrs. Small then returned to live at the home of John
Kounalis, his wife and his younger, single brother, defendant George Kounalis, hereafter ref erred to as
"George." During her four year association with Mrs.
Small, plaintiff had become very close to the Kounalis
clan and considered them as her "family." She even
moved into an apartment next door to the Kounalis
home when her parents home was sold. In July 1962,
George was arrested and charged in Federal Court in
San Diego, California with a felony. His attorney fee
was $3,500.00, of which he paid $1,000.00. He also paid
$1,032.25 in October 1962, to recover his car, which had
been confiscated, and paid $100.00 in March 1963 to
settle the fine imposed upon him by the court. (George
depos. p. 5, L. 24 - p. 6, L. 4; p. 18, L. 2 - 8)
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The $3,632.24 balance was paid by money advanced
by plaintiff, on oral agreements, during the period from
October, 1962, through March, 1963. The transactions
are best stated in plaintiff's own words in her deposition at page 11, lines 16-25:
"A. John was the one that first approached
me on it. George apparrntly didn't have the
money, and he was in difficulty. He asked me if
I \vould consider loaning it to them - John did.
It was a verbal agreement that it would be repaid
baek. He said that it might be five or six years,
hut that it would be repaid. He explained to me
\Yhat the problem was. I said, 'Fine.' I happened to have the money and they happened to
be like family. I was at their home for Christmas
and Thanksgiving, and they were very nice people.
And if your friends are in trouble, you try to
help them; so I just gave them the money."
Plaintiff reiterated several times in her deposition that
the loan was made only on John's promise that it would
he repaid. (Pltf. depos. p. 29, L. 13-15; p. 31, L. 17;
p. 32, L. 22-25)
George acknowledges that he received the subject
money from John. (George depos. p. 17, L. 1-25) John
acknowledges that he received the money from plaintiff
and paid it on to George. (John depos. p. 6, L. 20-21)
The defendants admit only that $2,532.25 was advanced
tlwm by plaintiff. (John depos. p. 7, L. 8-9) They deny
an.\' loan, and claim plaintiff made them a gift of the
mone_\'. (John depos. p. 12, L. 7-21)
During 1963 and into January, 1964, J olm let plaintiff obtain groceries at his store totalling $726.00. He
3

never billed her for them, but did keep all of the tapes.
(John depos. p. 13, L. 9-15 ; p. 14, L. 20-25) Plaintiff
claims these were payments on the loan. (Pltf. depos.
p. 34, L 18; p. 35, L. 9) John claims the $726.00 in
groceries was his gift to plaintiff. (John depos. p. 18,
L. 5-19)
In 1964 George paid plaintiff $100.00, and in 1967
paid her $50.00. Plaintiff claims these were payments
on the loan (pltf. depos. p. 29, L. 21-p. 30, L. 6), George
claims these payments 'vere gifts. (George depos. p. 12,
L. 17-19; p. 14, L. 1-12)
On October 27, 1968, plaintiff sued defendants on
the debts. (R. 1) The filing was five and one-half years
from the last loan made in March 1963. It was four
years and seven months from the last payment, free
groceries, made by John. It was one year from the last
payment, $50.00, made by George.
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THERE WAS A
GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT AS TO WHETHER THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAD RUN, WHEN
PLAINTIFF BROUGHT SUIT SIX YEARS AFTER
THE LOANS WERE MADE, BUT LESS THAN FOUR
YEARS AFTER THEY WERE IN DEF AULT

On plaintiff's motion to set aside the summary judgment, the trial court was asked as to the basis of its
ruling, so that arguments could be to the point. The
court replied that its ruling was based solely on the statute of limitations. (R. 5-6) This appeal concerns itself
solely with that issue.
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Plaintiff's loans were made in a period from October 1962 through March 1963. ( Pltf. depos. p. 9, L. 13-25;
p. 10, L. 2-3) The loans were on oral contract. The
applicable statute of limitations is four years (78-1225 ( 1) PCA, 1953). Plaintiff did not expect repayment
for about five years. (Pltf. depos. p. 11, L. 16-20; p. 18,
L. 3-4; p. 28, L. 16-18; p. 29, L. 13-15)
The issue of law is whether the statute of limitations
begins to run when a contract is made, or when a contract is in default. The issue of fact is to determine
the point in time when the loans were in default. If
this point was within four years of the commencement
of the lawsuit, then the statue of limitations has not run.
Holloway v. Wetzel, 86 U. 387, 45 P.2d 565, concerns a written contract with the issue before the court
'"hether the statute of limitations begins to run on the
dae of the contract or the date of default. The court
stated, at 86 U. 391, "This action was commenced August
22, 1933. The note sued upon is alleged to have become
due December 12, 1925. It would be barred if no payments, acknowledgments or new promises were made,
six years thereafter, being December 12, 1931." The
case lacks discussion, but clearly states that the date of
default is the date on which the statute begins to run.
lt could be argued, that if the date of execution of the
contract automatically commenced the period of limitations, that no creditor or mortgagee could safely make
a written contract running more than six years. Certainly on a long term mortgage, if payments are missed
at say the eighth year, the statute then begins to run,
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and this is not because payments have tolled the statute
but because until there is an actual default, the statutP'
hasn't begun to run at all.
01wn account and implied contract cases must lw
distinguished. In these, the rule is that a short time for
payment is implied and tlwn the statute starts to run.
JI orris v. Russell, 120 U. 545, 236 P.2d 451. This n1le is
based on the assumption that the contract is in defm1lt
about a month from its execution. In the case at bar
'
the point at which the loans were in default is not clear.
This is precisely the point 1Yhich should haYe precluded
the summary judgment. It is analogous, in a sense, to
cases of misuse of funds by a corporation, or of fraud.
where the statute does not begin to nm when the improper payment is made, but from the datP of discovery,
which is analogous to default. Petty & Riddle, Inc. rs.
Lunt, 104 U. 130, 138 P.2d G4S. In Crofoot v. Thatcher
and Josselyn, 19 U. 212, 57 P. 171, a demand note for a
subscription in corporate stock was given. Eight years
later, the corporation having failed, demand was made
by the corporate receiYer on the note. On refusal of
the demand, suit was filed. The court held that the debt
was not in default, and the statute had not rnn, unhl
after demand had been made, and denied a defense of
the statute of limitations.
The general rule is stated in 34 Am Jur, Limitation
of Actions, ~113, P. 91:
"Accrual of cause of action. In General. It
is of the essence of statutes of limitations that
time begins to run under them as to causes of
action only after the right to prosecute them to
6

a successful conclusion has fullv accrued. . . .
As the rnle is otherwise expre~sed, a right of
action accrues ·whenever such a breach of duty
or contract has occurred or such a wrong has
been sustained, as will give a right to bring and
sustain a suit. Conversely, the right to commence
an action arises the moment the cause of action
accrues. In the absence of a statute to the contrary, the test in each case is whether the party
asserting the claim is entitled to maintain an
action to enforce it, for no limitation commences
to nm against any demand until the obligation
or demand is due and payable, in the sense that
it is defined sufficiently to be capable of enforcement."
If the statute of limitations begins to run when the
tanse of action accrues, when does the cause accrue~
In addition to Crofoot v. Thatcher and Joselyn, supra,
other Utah cases bearing on the point are State Tax
Comrn. v. Spanish Fork, 99 U. 177, 100 P.2d 575, "The
question is then, when did the cause of action accrue~
The general rule is that it accrnes at the time it becomes
remedial in the courts, that is when the claim is in such
('Ondition that the courts can proceed and give judgment
if the claim is established ... ordinarily a cause of action
for a debt begins to run when the debt is due and payable because at that time an action can be maintained to
enforcP it." Wilson vs. W cber Co., 100 U. 141, 111 P.2d
147 (Suit against government for refund of taxes, with
statute requiring claim to be made before lawsuit can
hn filed and holding that cause of action accrues not
wlwn there is a liability, but only when liability is in
~mrh a position that suit can be filed); Last Clear Chance
Ra11ch Co. v. Erickson, 82 U. 475, 25 P.2d 952 (Contract
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for conveyance of stock "forthwith." Question of fact
as to time meant by "forthwith," and statute starts to
run from such time.)

1 Am J ur 2d, Actions §89, p. 618 states, "Thus, in
the case of a contract calling for the payment of money,
there can be no action at law commenced for the recovery
of the money before it becomes payable in accordance
with the terms of the contract."
An action for payment of money on an oral contract, if commenced prematurely, will be dismissed, because the cause of action has not accrued. Bowers v.
Bowers, 99 S.W. 2d 334 (Texas); Werber v. Atkinson,
84 A. 2d 111 (D.C., 1951).
In sum, plaintiff had a claim against defendants as
of the date of the loans. She did not have a cause of
action until the claim was overdue. Determination of
the time when the claim -was due is a question of fact.
The question itself is rather limited, because defendants
deny the existence of a loan at all, so can't state a time
when payment was due. The only testimony is plaintiff's,
to the effect that she did not expect full repayment for
up to five years, and that she had received payment
during the interim in part, as she had requested it, by
free groceries from John during 1963 and 1964, and
cash payments by George during 1964 and 1967. It would
be a great hardship on plaintiff, and a dangerous construction of the statutf) of limitations, to rule that a
party not expecting full payment on a claim for a number
of years, and receiving partial payments as demanded
8

during that time, is subject to the statute of limitations
from the date of the contract.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AS TO DEFENDANT, GEORGE KOUN ALIS, BECAUSE THERE WAS AN ISSUE OF
FACT AS TO WHETHER MONIES HE PAID TO
PLAINTIFF IN 1964 AND 1967 TOLLED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

George admits that he paid to plaintiff, by check,
$100.00 in 1964 (the time of year is not clear in the
depositions of the parties), and $50.00 in 1967. (George
depos. p. 12, L. 18-19) He admits that he made the payments because, "I felt a little obligated" (George depos.
p. 13, L. 8; p. 14, L. 7-8; p. 14, L. 25-p. 15, L. 3), that
he would have repaid his brother John for the money
if John had pressed him, but that he knew the true
source of the money was plaintiff. (George depos. p. 16,
L. 9-15)
Plaintiff claims these payments to be payments on
her loan to George. ( Pltf. depos. p. 18, L. 15-20; p. 27,
L. 14-19)
78-12-25 ( 1), U CA, 1953, provides a four year limitation on an oral contract, but 78-12-44, UCA, 1953, provides that payment of "any part of principal or intere~t . . . " restarts the limitation period. Holloway v.
Wetzer, 86 U. 387, 45 P. 2d 565; Crompton. v. Jenson, 78
U. 55, 1 P. 2d 242.
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In light of the foregoing facts and law, it is difficult
to understand how thP trial court, other than hy inadvertence, could have included George in a summary judgment based on the statute of limitations, when George
admits payments within four years and admits that they
were made from a sense of obligation on the loan.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHEN THERE WERE UNRESOLVED ISSUES OF FACT WHICH WOULD
DETERMINE THE RESULT OF THE CASE.

Points I and II of this brief state unresolved issues.
Rule 56 ( c) URCP provides:
"MOTION AND PROCEEDINGS THEREON. The
motion shall be served at least 10 days from the time
fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to tlw
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The
judgment sounght shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that t71erc is 110 gcm1i11e issue as to any material
fact and that the nioving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of la'"° A summary judgment, interlocnton'
in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability
alon<' although there is a gPnnine issne as to the amount
of damages." (emphasis add{:'d)
Utah law is well settled that a slm1mar)- judgment
shall he granted only if there is no genuine issue as to
an)- material facts, and in wt>ighing facts, the imrt.1·
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against whom the summary judgment is sought, has the
benefit of having the evidence considered in the light
most favorable to him. Morris v. Farnsworth Motel,
123 U. 289, 259 P. 2d 297; Whitman v. W. T. Grant Co.,
16 U. 2d 81, 395 P. 2d 918; Young v. Felornia, 121 U. 646,
244 p. 2d 862.
As to John, there is one issue, to wit: whether there
is an issue of fact as to when the loans were in default
and the statute of limitations began to run, in consideration of plaintiff's testimony that she did not consider
payment due for a number of years.
As to George, there is the same issue, and a second
issue, to wit: whether payments he made within four
year of filing of the complaint were gifts or payment
on the loan.
These issues could not be determined as a matter
of law because they involve factual disputes.
Respectfully submitted,
SAMUEL KING
409 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Plaintiff
and Appellant
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